In(Efficient) Peace: The Relationship between International and Domestic Efforts at Post-Conflict Peacebuilding

Report

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I. Introduction

Peacebuilding is a cost-effective alternative to war.² This report examines the dynamics of one condition of cost-effective peacebuilding: the coordination (or alignment) of post-conflict peacebuilding efforts among international peacekeeping missions and domestic leaders. “Coordination” is understood as both groups seeking to address the same issue-area. The report findings identify a relationship between the coordination of domestic and international reconstruction efforts and improved cost-effectiveness. This relationship is not constant across all issue-areas: the coordination of reconstruction efforts in civil administrative reform and police reform, for example, leads to more improved cost-effectiveness than coordination around election reform/monitoring. When complete coordination is not possible, a rank-ordering of preferences may therefore be preferred.

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1 “Cost-to-peace” ratio, as detailed later, is defined as the total cost of a peacekeeping mission, divided by the number of years without armed conflict.

II. Why Cost-Effective Peacekeeping Matters?

From El Salvador to Namibia to East Timor, UN peacekeeping missions have seen repeated success in bringing decades-long conflicts to an end. However, missions are expensive, and (provisions of officers, soldiers, and personnel) resources are limited. Missions must operate at an extreme financial disadvantage: annual funding for peacekeeping missions is less than one percent of the world’s military spending. The total military expenditures in 2017 is estimated at over $1.7 trillion; in contrast, the UN approved just $6.7 billion to fund its ongoing missions.

To make matters worse, funding is becoming increasingly scarce, with leading donor countries calling for a cutting of finances to even lower levels. Under President Donald Trump’s guidance, the United States submitted in 2017 a budget proposal with a 13% reduction in funds. As the plurality contributor (over 20%) to the total financing for peacekeeping missions, the United States government’s proposed budget passed.

At the same time, the UN (and its regional partners) are engaging in even more—and longer—peacekeeping missions. Since its first mission in 1948, the UN has started and closed 57 missions across five continents. At the time of writing, there are 15 ongoing missions. Many of these missions—for example, Kosovo and Western Sahara/Morocco—have been in operation since the end of the Cold War. Five missions have been in operation for nearly a half century—or longer. Originally peacekeeping missions were engaged in monitoring of ceasefires. However, more and more missions are authorized by the UN Security Council to operate as multidimensional peacekeeping missions. Tasked with enforcing and implementing negotiated settlements, these missions necessarily require larger, longer-lasting funding resources.

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3 Peacekeeping missions and peacebuilding processes are not the same. However, since the end of the Cold War, the former has largely adopted the characteristics of the latter. This report uses peacekeeping to refer to the mission and peacebuilding to refer to the efforts and processes.


9 These are: UNFICYP, UNMOGIP, UNTSO, UNDOF, and UNIFIL.

10 Multidimensional peacekeeping missions are discussed in greater detail below.
These developing trends mean that, in order to reach the same peace-promoting objectives, with fewer funds, UN peacekeeping missions must become more cost-effective. They must be able to provide greater amounts of “peace” for the same amount of funding. This concern is similar to the related body of research which has sought to identify the mechanisms behind financial/development assistance and peace duration. The results are mixed. On the one hand, for example, foreign aid may serve as a social stabilizer, reducing uncertainty for citizens and reducing the incentive to return to conflict. The return-on-investment estimates are up to $17 for every aid-dollar spent. On the other hand, foreign aid may become a conflict facilitator, siphoned off from humanitarian purposes to strengthen combatants.

While the studies discussed above, among others, have examined the role and cost-effectiveness of foreign aid in post-conflict societies, little is known about the cost-effectiveness of UN peacekeeping missions in eliminating armed conflict. This has created a critical gap in the literature, in at least two ways. First, it leaves peacekeeping missions to stumble in the dark. As we enter a world with greater constraints on peacekeeping resources, it is vital for missions to have a clearer set of guidelines to “make do” with what is available. Second—and relatedly—we are left unsure of the level at which peacekeeping missions can become more cost-effective. Indeed, much of the research in the early 2000s examines the state-level and structural determinants of peace. Recently, there has been a “local-level” turn, with scholars beginning to examine the micro-dynamics of peace and peacekeeping. However, the answer may lie in between these two extremes. That is, there is room for improvements in peacebuilders’ cost-effectiveness at the institutional/program level. This report begins to fill this gap by demonstrating this relationship.

This report argues that greater coordination between domestic and international efforts in rebuilding post-conflict institutions leads to improved cost-effectiveness in UN peacekeeping missions. To do so, the report briefly outlines the evolution of UN peacekeeping missions, including institution-rebuilding dimensions, and then discusses how the alignment of international and domestic reconstruction efforts can increase cost-effectiveness.

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11 Funding must stretch further or, as Sheamer et al. (2017) put it, there must be more “bank for their buck.” Available at http://www.miltlaenstein.com/uploads/8/5/5/9/85599410/cost-effectiveness_for_peacebuilding.pdf.
15 See, e.g., Fortna (ibid),
III. Improving the Cost-Effectiveness of UN Peacekeeping Missions through the Coordination of Domestic and International Peacebuilding Efforts

UN peacekeeping missions operated much differently in their nascent years than they do today. In their earliest years (post-World War II), UN peacekeeping missions were exclusively tasked with monitoring ceasefires. Neither Cold War superpower (the United and the Soviet Union) preferred the UN to independently reshape post-conflict societies. Thus, the mission mandates were short, and, consequently, the missions were ill-equipped and lowly funded.

With the end of the Cold War came the emergence of multidimensional peacekeeping missions. Rather than simply observe peace, these missions now seek to build peace through more robust mandates. Operating under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, these missions assist domestic actors in implementing comprehensive peace agreements (also known as negotiated settlements) to which the (previously) warring parties have agreed. Mission tasks are widespread, often including election monitoring, security sector reform, and professionalization of the judiciary. These processes are the key components of the negotiated settlements.

This shift in mission-type, from observing peace to building peace, was necessary because preventing the recurrence of armed conflict necessitates structural transformation. The changes necessary are not uniform but rather rely on context-dependent factors. To carry out their mandate, these multidimensional missions have required greater funding. Consequently, there is greater room for missions to be cost-ineffective through wasted efforts at post-conflict reconstruction.

Specifically, international peacekeeping missions can be cost-ineffective when they do not align their effort and priorities with those the leaders of the post-conflict country. By signing a negotiated settlement, domestic elites identify a set of issue-area they agree to address in the post-conflict society. These arrangements focus on institutional changes. Peacekeeping missions can assist domestic leaders in implementing negotiated settlements by aligning the mission priorities with those laid out in the settlements. In El Salvador, for example, both the Chapultepec Peace Agreement and UN mission focused on police reform. In Cambodia, in contrast, domestic elites agreed to eliminate paramilitary forces under the 1991 Comprehensive Political Settlement, while the UN mission in the country did not include this as an issue-area to be addressed in their mandate.

Coordination of alignment of domestic and international peacebuilding efforts can improve cost-effectiveness through at least two processes. First, they can share financial resources. In doing so, they reduce the amount of money each actor spends to reach the same amount of “peace” (no armed conflict). Second, coordination strengthens efforts and quickens
the reconstruction time. By aligning their efforts with domestic actors, UN peacekeeping missions can reach the same end goal (peace) under a shorter period and with less funding necessary.

IV. Research Methodology

This report identifies the relationship between the coordination of international and domestic peacebuilding efforts on the cost-effectiveness of peace. It does so by building an original dataset on (1) the issue-areas included in UN peacekeeping mandates (“mandate-issue-area dataset”), comparing the presence or absence of the issues-areas in the mandates to the (2) issue-areas in negotiated settlements, and analyzing the effect of alignment on (3) cost-effectiveness. I discuss each measurement in turn.

The mandate-issue-area dataset identifies the issue-areas included in the mandates for all UN peacekeeping missions of the post-Cold War era (1988 to 2017).17 The oldest mission included in the dataset is the UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (May 1988); the most recent is the UN Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (April 2017 to present). Each mission may include just one mandate, if the mandate applies to the whole period for which peacekeepers were deployed, or it may include dozens of mandates, if the mission received updated instructions/authorizations/renewals over their deployment. All relevant mandates were included in the analysis.

Each mission’s mandate was read and analyzed to determine the domestic issue-areas the mission was authorized to address. There is a wide array of issue-areas, ranging from human rights items to economic and social development, from sector reform to election monitoring. For example, UNSC Resolution 1213 (1998) extended the deployment of the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA), and it emphasized the need to rebuild the rule of law. Therefore, this mandate for MONUA is coded to have included efforts at judicial reform. The mission-mandate is the unit of analysis in the dataset. A snapshot of the dataset is included in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Mandate Resolution No.</th>
<th>Judicial Reform</th>
<th>Police Reform</th>
<th>…</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>MONUA</td>
<td>1149</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>MONUA</td>
<td>1213</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>MIPONUH</td>
<td>1212</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>MIPONUH</td>
<td>1277</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>…</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 1: Snapshot of the Mandate-Issue-Area Dataset*

17 The earliest missions took place in the Middle East (UNTSO, 1948) and India-Pakistan (UNGOMIP, 1949).
To determine international-domestic coordination, I combined these data with an existing dataset on issue-areas in domestic peace agreements. Titled the Peace Accords Matrix, this dataset deploys a similar coding criteria to identify the issue-areas included in domestic peace agreements. For example, the 1994 Lusaka Protocol for Angola included arrangements on the ceasefire, as well as police reform. It did not include arrangements on judicial reform. I identified international-domestic coordination on a specific issue-area when both the peace agreements and mission mandates for the same country/conflict included the same issue-area. Thus, for Angola, there is an alignment in police reform efforts. However, there was misalignment on judicial reform. I then added up the total count for each country-conflict to obtain the total amount of alignment. This is referred to as the total alignment at the “mission/case-level.” A snapshot thereof is provided in Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Alignment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 2: Snapshot of Total Alignment of Reconstruction Efforts*

The effect of coordination on cost-effectiveness can be disaggregated further, with variation taking place across different issue-areas. The effect of coordination on cost-effectiveness may be greater with judicial reform than, say, electoral reform/monitoring. I consider this relationship further, referring to it as alignment at the “issue-area-level.”

Measuring the cost-effectiveness of peacekeeping is indeed difficult. There is no set metric to do so, because the empirical outcomes and efforts deployed are context-dependent. Nevertheless, because the most fundamental goal of peacebuilding is an end to armed conflict, I identify *effectiveness* as such. This is novel for most analyses of cost-effectiveness. I draw from the UCDP/PRIO dataset on armed conflict to identify if an armed conflict occurred in a given year of a peacekeeping mission. I operationalize cost as the total amount of spending for a

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19 Indeed, the coding criteria for the mandate-issue-area dataset draws from this dataset.
21 This variable is measured as at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a given year.
22 The data are available from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program/Peace Research Institute of Oslo at https://www.prio.org/Data/Armed-Conflict/Onset-and-Duration-of-Intrastate-Conflict/.
given peacekeeping mission. These measures provide me with the “cost-peace ratio:” the amount of funding in a given mission for one year of peace.

V. Findings

V.a. Cost-Effectiveness at the Mission/Case-Level

If greater coordination improves mission cost-effectiveness, we should see a negative relationship between the amount of alignment in issue-areas addressed and the cost-peace ratio. This is because a lower cost-peace ratio signals improved peacebuilding cost-effectiveness. For example, if a peacekeeping mission cost $10,000,000 for two years of sustained peace, the ratio would be 5,000,000. If a peacekeeping mission cost $10,000,000 for three years of peace, the ratio would be 3,333,333. The latter example is more effective than the former, because the same funding provides for more years of peace.

Figure 1 graphs the relationship between total alignment (at the mission level) and the cost-peace ratio. As we can see, the expectations hold: there is a negative relationship between alignment and the cost-peace ratio, as demonstrated with the line.

![Figure 1: Relationship between Total Alignment and the Cost-Peace Ratio](image)

East Timor

Sierra Leone

Cost-Peace Ratio

Fitted values

Total Alignment

Figure 1: Relationship between Total Alignment and the Cost-Peace Ratio

(East Timor and Sierra Leone labeled, for comparison)

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24 Note that, while the cost-peace ratio does reflect the total amount of funds estimated for one year of peace, it should nevertheless be treated as its own measurement and therefore is written without a currency symbol.
At the one end of extremes is East Timor (labeled, top-left). There were a total of three aligned issue-areas between the peacekeeping missions and the domestic peace agreement, and the cost-peace ratio is nearly 3.5 billion. This leads to a cost-peace ratio of just over 1 billion per alignment. On the other extreme is Sierra Leone (right, labeled), with 24 aligned-issue areas and a cost-peace ratio of just under 1 billion. The result is a cost-peace ratio of about 42 million per alignment. In comparison, then, alignment of peacebuilding efforts in Sierra Leone is associated with a better cost-peace ratio than those in East Timor.25

Even more successful, in terms of the cost-peace ratio, were the efforts in Liberia. Having survived two brutal civil wars (1989 – 1997 and 1999 – 2003), the country has experienced 25 years of internationally-assisted peacebuilding efforts, the first known as the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (1993 – 2003), and the second being the United Nations Mission in Liberia (2003 – 2018). Overall, both the domestic leaders, through the Accra Peace Agreement, and UN peacekeeping mission coordinated on 19 issue-areas, from military reform to rebel demobilization to children’s rights. Overall, there were 18 years of sustained peace. As a result, the cost-peace ratio was just 97,331,578—nothing, compared to the trillions of dollars devoted each year to military spending.

The correlation coefficient of “alignment” and the “cost-peace” ratio is 0.17, which suggests moderate correlation. Running a simple linear regression of the relationship between total alignment and the cost-peace ratio provides us with an even more detailed account. On average, increasing the alignment of post-conflict reconstruction by one issue-area is associated with a decrease in the cost-peace ratio of 23.5 million. This is not a trivial amount. Rather, it demonstrates that coordination between domestic and international actors at the mission level matter greatly for cost-effectiveness.

V.b. Cost-Effectiveness at the Issue-Area-Level

Indeed, the previous analysis demonstrates that increased alignment of international and domestic reconstruction efforts is associated with an improved cost-peace ratio. Nevertheless, this measurement is at the mission-level. However, because coordination occurs at the institution-level (rebuilding specific institutions), alignment’s effects can vary widely within the same mission. This section moves the analysis to the institution level to examine variation in cost-effectiveness in three important issue-areas: civil administrative reform, police reform, and election reform.

Figure 2 (below) is a box plot demonstrating the varied relationship between alignment and non-alignment for a select set of post-conflict institutions. Civil administrative and police reform have lower cost-peace ratios, on average, when aligned, as compared to when they are

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25 While East Timor may appear to be an outlier, there is no theoretical reason to remove it from the dataset.
non-aligned. Alignment of these one issue-area can improve cost-effectiveness, independent of aligning other issue-areas. In contrast, election reform’s cost-peace ratio is slightly higher when aligned than non-aligned. This demonstrates that the cost-peace ratio of alignment is not static across issue-areas but instead varies with the institution that actors seek to reform. This finding is particularly important in light of recent funding cuts to peacekeeping missions and enlarged and elongated peacekeeping mandates.

Table 3 further reviews the independent effect of each of these three institutional reforms/issue-areas. Rather than analyzing the effect of overall alignment on the peace-cost ratio, I examined the effect of alignment in each issue-area *independently* on the cost-peace ratio. The choice to coordinate efforts in civil administrative reform is associated with a decrease in the peace-cost ratio by 419,000,000, compared to peacekeeping missions which do not align with domestic agreements. On the other hand, coordination of police reform is associated with an *increase* in the cost-peace ratio by 27,800,000. This may be due to the fact that police reform projects are often quite costly, requiring a battery of new programs, academies, competent staff, and so forth. As a result, it inflates the ratio. Thus, while future research should examine this relationship further, a “rank-order” preference appears to develop, with certain reform efforts more cost-effective than others, in terms of the cost-peace ratio.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutional Reform</th>
<th>Effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil Administrative Reform</td>
<td>Coordination is associated with a decrease in the cost-peace ratio by 419,000,000.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Reform</td>
<td>Coordination is associated with an increase in the cost-peace ratio by 27,800,000.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Reform/ Monitoring</td>
<td>Coordination is associated with a decrease in the cost-peace ratio by 365,000,000.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 3: Effects of coordination along three specific institutional reforms on the cost-peace ratio*
V.c. Descriptive Information

This section provides a further array of descriptive information. I first include in Table 4 a list of the 10 issue-areas with the greatest amount of international-domestic coordination. The percentages represent the amount of cases in which they aligned.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Issue-Area</th>
<th>Percent Alignment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ceasefire</td>
<td>81.25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Demobilization</td>
<td>68.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Disarmament</td>
<td>68.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Displaced Individuals</td>
<td>68.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Election Monitoring/Reform</td>
<td>62.25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>62.25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Military Reform</td>
<td>62.25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Police Reform</td>
<td>62.25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Military Reintegration</td>
<td>62.25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>International Donor Support</td>
<td>56.25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 4: Top-Five Issue-Areas, by the Percent of International-Domestic Alignment*

The top positions are dominated by security-oriented issue-areas, which makes sense: in order to promote peace, there must be an end to armed conflict. Beyond security issues, there is election monitoring/reform and human rights; international donor support rounds out the list. No issue-area sees greater coordination in more than 81.25% cases. However, there is quite a few cases with alignment at over half. This suggests that international peacekeeping missions are aware of domestic efforts and take (at least partial) care to promote them in their own efforts.

The high degree of variation in coordination does not stop at the issue-area level. There is a high degree of variation at the mission/case level as well. I include in Table 5 a snapshot of the best and worst cases, ranked by the their percent of international-domestic coordination.

Table 5 demonstrates a wide variation in alignment. Sierra Leone leads all cases with over half (56%) of issue-areas being coordinated, followed by Liberia and Rwanda. On the other end are Guatemala and Macedonia, both with 5% coordination. This furthermore suggests that there is room for improvement in coordination and, because Sierra Leone is the leading case in the relationship between coordination and the cost-peace ratio, that greater coordination should be stressed. Further research should examine this relationship in greater detail.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Total Alignment</th>
<th>Percent Alignment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>55.81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>44.19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>41.86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.65%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Snapshot of Cases by Percent Alignment

VI. Conclusion and Next Steps

UN peacekeeping missions are stretched thin in their resources, and they are being stretched even further with the slashing of funds and proliferation of issues to be addressed in their mandates. As a result, it is increasingly important that the UN Peacekeeping Office pay greater attention to the cost-effectiveness of their efforts. This report has contributed to this discussion by providing an in-depth analysis of how coordination between international (UN) and domestic post-conflict reconstruction efforts impacts the cost to peace ratio.

The analysis finds that there is a relationship between the increased alignment of international-domestic efforts in rebuilding post-conflict institutions and the ratio of total UN mission expenditures to the years of sustained peace. However, the effect is not equal across all issue-areas. That is, the relationship may be more powerful within some issue-areas than others. As outlined herein, civil administrative reform is the most consequential. Nevertheless, coordination may, indeed be more costly, as demonstrated with police reform.

Policymakers and practitioners may draw at least three important recommendations from this report:

1. Coordination of international and domestic efforts does, in fact, matters for cost-effectiveness. It is therefore imperative that peacekeeping missions take into greater consideration domestic efforts when defining the issue-areas to be addressed in their missions.
2. Because the relationship is not equal across all reform efforts, practitioners should be cognizant of coordination of the most cost-effective issue-areas. This suggests that a preferential rank-ordering may be constructed. This is especially important if the downward trend continues in funding allocation.
3. Increased communication between both levels—the international community and domestic leaders—may be useful. While local peacekeeping offices do exist in post-conflict countries, coordination efforts should comprise a more dominant aspect of the
initial stages of a mission itself. This will ensure that peacekeeping missions are cost-effective, going forward.

Future studies should examine further the relationship between the coordination of peacebuilding efforts among different actors and the consequences they present for cost-effectiveness. While this study examined the relationship between UN peacekeeping missions and domestic efforts to implement peace agreements, there are many other actors involved in post-conflict reconstruction today. Multilaterally, there is the African Union and European Union, among others. Each of these institutions has their own set of peacekeeping missions with mandates outlining the issue-areas they will seek to address. This report’s study could easily be extended to include these international actors as well. Moreover, the United States and France are leading actors in aid and rebuilding. Consequently, it would be just as useful to examine the effects of bilateral (state-to-state) coordination on lasting peace. The bottom line is that funds are becoming increasingly limited for international peacebuilding efforts. It is therefore imperative that we understand what can be done to maximize the positive impact of each dollar spent.
Appendix. Alternative Specification

The population range amongst the countries in this report is quite large, ranging from nearly 20 million (after conflict) in Côte d’Ivoire to about 850,000 in East Timor. The dynamics behind peacebuilding may therefore vary. An alternative conceptualization of cost-effectiveness takes population into consideration by calculating the cost of each peacekeeping mission, per person, per year.\(^{26}\) Figures A.1 depicts this alternative specification; Figure A.2 depicts the same, removing East Timor as a potential outlier:

![Figure A.1: Relationship between Total Alignment and the Cost-Population-Peace Ratio](image1)

![Figure A.2: Relationship between Total Alignment and the Cost-Population-Peace Ratio (East Timor Removed)](image2)

We see a divergence in the expected relationship. Figure A.1, which includes East Timor, reflects a similar relationship to that of the original cost-peace ratio. Indeed, the relationship is negative, with a predicted lowering of the ratio by 51 per additional case of alignment. Figure A.2, removing East Timor as a potential outlier, depicts a positive relationship. More specifically, the model estimates an increase in the ratio by about 3.5 per additional case of alignment.

While the relationship in Figure A.2 is contradictory to the expected (and desired) outcome, it nevertheless should not suggest that peacekeeping is a loss. The measurement effectively suggests that the cost of increased alignment, per citizen, per year, is 3.5 US dollars. Taken in the context of per-capita funding for armed conflict, this value is much preferred. In this way, even

\(^{26}\) Population data for each country was retrieved from [https://www.worlddata.info/](https://www.worlddata.info/).
though it correlates with greater costs to peacekeeping missions, greater alignment still has a comparative advantage.